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Abstract
A convenient framework for an empirical model of time allocation data was
derived in Gronau (1977). The fundamental dichotomy property of this model
can be employed to derive a behavioural model for home production decisions
without having to specify a household utility function. Even if the model is
extended to allow for specific types of direct utility from household produc-
tion activities (so called joint production) the dichotomy property prevails.
We discuss the identification properties of this model for one and two adult
households. Next, we turn to a specific formulation, that generalizes the Cobb-
Douglas model used in Graham 8z Green (1984). It is argued that the original
model is not well-specified and that estimates of the level of home production
from that model are determined by arbitrary normalising assumptions, implicit
in the model specification. In fact it is shown, that in the more general model,
estimates of the level of output of household production cannot be calculated
from data on the time inputs only. The modified model is applied to time-
allocation data from the Swedish HUS-data. The estimation results provide
further insights into the limitations of the specification used and of the use of
Gronau's dichotomy property in empirical applications.
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stimulating discussiona.1 Introduction
For several of the issues that motivate the analysis of the allocation of time within
households, a purely descriptive, reduced form analysis of time allocation figures does
not suffice. One such issue is the evaluation of the output of home production in an
economy. This quantity can be estimated by the total value of the production factors
that were used. Normally, however, we do not have information about all of these
inputs (e.g., auxiliary goods). But even if we could measure all the quantities of the
factors that were employed, this approach would systematically ignore any returns
to scale and therefore the value added in home production. Furthermore, we would
havc to know thc value of an individual's timc. For Lhosc individuals, tliat havc a
job, their value of time can be set equal to their net marginal wage rate. But for
individuals that chose not to participate in the labour force, no wage rate is observed
and although a potential wage rate could be estimated, this would only constitute a
lowerbound for the value of their time.
Determining an individual's value of time is also important for different types of
questions, for example in studying labour supply or job search. Knowledge of the
household production structure provides us with a method for estimating the value
of time for everyone. Estimation of the value of time of economic agents is therefore
another issue for which structural models of household production decisions may be
required.
A micro-economic framework within which this kind of decisions can be formal-
ized, was developed by Gary Becker (1965). Together with Lancaster (1966) this
article served as a starting-point for what came to be known as the househo[d produc-
tion approach. In these models the preferences of a household are not defined in terms
of quantities of goods and non-labour time, but rather in terms of activities or house-
hold products that are produced with the aid of these goods and time endowments.
As a flexible model for the micro-economic decision process this approach has proved
to be of great value, in particular in theoretical analyses. The implicit need for a
detailed description of activities and the introduction of production functions, about
the outputs of which typically no information is available, has prohibited empirical
applications of this framework. With only slightly more detailed information about
the time uses, the researcher now has to identify a two-layered utility factory. More
specifically, we only know that some observed combination of inputs (time and goods)
was used in producing a set of (latent) activities, that was preferred over all other
sets of activities that could have been produced by feasible combinations of inputs.
For an empirical analysis one is forced to cut down on the level of detail in which the
activities are defined and one is bound to impose further restrictions in order to be
able to disentangle the roles of the production structure and the preferences.
An elegant way of doing so was proposed by Gronau (1977, 1980). The central
assumption in these articles is that home produced commodities and market goods are
perfect substitutes. This assumption and the high degree of aggregation of activities
1considerably simplify an empirical analysis and lead to explicit testable predictions.
In the first article Gronau still used a tobit-model to test for these properties, but
in Gronau (1980) the framework was put to use in deriving a structural econometric
specification.
Pollak 8z Wachter (1975) argued that people don't always spend their time exclu-
sively on one activity at a time. Even in the highly aggregated Gronau model it is
likely to be the case that the time people spend on home production activities is also
partially considered as leisure. Graham 8z Green (1984) estimated a version of the
Gronau model in which they allowed for this type of joint production. This extension
raises the question of identifiability once again. Moreover, the estimates Graham óz
Green presented for American time allocation data were not very promising. Esti-
mates of this model for Dutch and Swedish data were even less satisfactory.
In the next section we will discuss the Gronau model and joint production in
more detail and present some results on the (non-parametric) identifiability whithin
this class of models. In section 3 we will consider a specific formulation. This model
slightly generalizes the model that was used by Graham 8c Green. It will be argued
that the differences between these models can partially explain the poor record of the
Graham 8~ Green specification. These differences also lead to different assessments
as to whether the complete household production function can be identified from
time allocation data only. An empirical application to the Swedish HUS-data will be
presented in section 4. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
22 The Gronau Model
In a neo-classical analysis of time allocation decisions, the marginal value of time for
each of the activities the individual decides to partake in, will be set equal. In prin-
ciple, these relationships can serve as a point of departure for an empirical analysis.
For an individual with a paid job the monetary (marginal) value of time is given by
his or her net marginal wage rate. A comparison to the monetary marginal value of
time in household activities, however, still involves the household's marginal utility
of money, the marginal utilities of these activities and the marginal productivities of
time used in producing them. Moreover, as the output of home production and some
of the inputs are unobserved the effect of the utility functions can in general not be
distinguished from that of the production functions. Identification in that general a
setting can only be forced by the choice of specific functional forms.
Gronau (1978, 1980) noted, that the analysis will be substantially símplified by
the assumption that output of the home production proc,ess is a perfect substitute
for goods that can be bought in the market. For the employed, the trade-off between
spending one more hour on home production and selling this hour in the labour
market, will thereby be reduced to a comparison of the wage rate and the marginal
product value of household production time. In this way the role of the utility function
is limited to the decision to allocate the time that is not used for home production
activities to leisure and work.
In the Gronau model the general framework oí Becker (1965) is simplified in the
following sense. In the utility function three types of argurnents are distinguished
(cf. the activities in Becker's model): consumption goods, commodities produced at
home and leisure of each of the household membersl. The consucnption goods enter
the utility function as a Hicksian composite good. This commodity can be considered
as total consumption expenditunes and will be denoted by Xm. The output of home
production will also be modelled as a composite good. This commodity, denoted by
Z, corresponds closest to Becker's concept of an activity: it is produced by combining
an amount of auxiliary goods (XZ) with home production time (Hm and H~, for the
male and the female partner respectively). The time people do not spend on working,
at home or in a job, is considered to be (pure) leisure. The crucial assumption in this
model is that consumption goods Xm and the output of household production Z are
perfect substitutes. We can therefore write the utility function as follows
U(Xm t Z, Lm, L~), (1)
where Lm and L~ are leisure enjoyed by the male and female partner respectively.
U is assumed to be strictly increasing, differentiable and quasi-concave. Efficient
production is characterized by the household production function
1We will only model the behaviour of the head of the household and - if present - his or her
partner. We can therefore distinguish two types of households: with one and with two adulta. The
presence of children or any other persons in the household will be treated as exogenous in the model.
For this analysis we will take the two adult family as the standard case.
3Z - Z(Hm, H~, X:)' (2)
Z is assumed to be a monotonically increasing and twice differentiable function of the
production factors. The optimal choice of purchases and time uses will be subject to
the household budget constraint:
XmfXZ-VfWmNmfWjN,, (3)
stating that total expenditures2 are equal to the sum of non-labour income (V) and
labour income, where W; is the net wage rate of partner i and N; is the number of
hours he or she works in a paid job. Finally, a feasíble allocation must satisfy the
following time constraints
H;-~L;fN;-T, i-m,f; (4)
T being the (daily) time endowment.
The household's decision problem can now be formalized as follows: the household
members maximize their joint utility as defined in (1), subject to (2), ( 3), (4) and
non-negativity constraints on X,,,, XZ and L;, N;, and H; (i - rn,f). We will assume
that by the choice of the utility function and the production function none of the
inequalities will be binding in an optimal allocation, except those of N,,, and N,.
This assumptíon is made for every combination of wage rates, non-labour income
and other exogenous variables, that we consider of interest. Moreover, it will be
assumed that for each of these combinations the optimum is unique. The solution
to the household's decision problem then has to satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (~,,, and ~, are the shadow prices of the inequality constraints on labour
time; restrictions (2), (3) and (4) have been substituted into the utility function):
az -1
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If in the optimum both partners participate in the labour force (N,,, ) 0, N, 1 0 and
~,T, - ~, - 0) equations (5) to (8) imply:
ZThe price level of the composite good is normalized at one.
4V7i
(HmiHf~Xs) - Wii t - mif~ (9) áH;
Equations (9) and (5) nurror tlie fundarnental dichotomy in the Gronau model. Pro-
vided that both partners have a job, the quantities of goods and time devoted to
household production are chosen without recourse to the utility function. In deriving
a sub-model that describes the household production decision we therefore only need
to specify the production funetion.3
For someone with a paid job, the existence of a unique interior optimum implies
that the production function has to be strictly concave in terms of his or her time
input and in XZ, at the optimal allocation. As a result, an increase in one's wage rate
will lead to a reduction of the number of hours spent on home production activities. If
the time inputs are complements in home production, the partner's home production
time will also be reduced. The reverse holds if the time inputs are substitutes. With
regard to changes in non-labour income, this model predicts the absence of an income
effect in the home production decisions of working couples. An increase of the non-
labour income will - if leisure is a normal good - reduce both partners' number of
hours worked in a job. But, provided both stay in the labour force, H,n, H~ and
Xz will remain unchanged. An overall increase in household productivity leads to
an incipient increase in the value of time. For individuals with a job, this will lead
to a reduction in labour time and an increase in both leisure and home production
time. When it is no longer optimal to participate in the labour force, a further rise in
productivity might even lead to a decrease in household production time, provided
the income effect is sufficiently strong. Productivity rises will t}rerefore only increase
the marginal value of time for individuals that do not participate in the labour force.
For two-earner households this model implies a two-stage decision structure, in
which the production decisions constitute the first stage and the remaining decisions
- the allocation of non-production time and the purchase of consumption goods - are
made in the second stage. The utility function only figures in the second stage. It
must be noted, however, that the labour force participation decisions do also involve
the utility function. This is important for econometric applications of the first-stage
sub-model ((5) and (9)). This model only applies for the non-random sub-sample
of working couples. For a structural model that would incorporate this endogenous
sample stratification, the utility function has to be specified. The first stage decisions
for the working couple can be stated by the following (partial) optimization problem:
max Z(Hm, H~, XZ) - WmHm - WjH~ - XZ.
H,,,,HI,X,
(10)
Pollak 8e Wachter stressed that the presence ofjoint production poses a problem in
modelling household production. In this relatively aggregated setting possibilities for
joint production between activities are mostly contained in the production function.
9Note that the asaumption that the net marginal wage rate is (conaidered to be) conatant ia vital
for the dichotomy property to hold. Otherwiae, N,,, or N~ will enter the right hand sidea of (9).
5One important type of joint production is still excluded in this model: household
production time that is also perceived as leisure. An extension that fits into the
Gronau framework was suggested by Graham 8a Green ( 1984). Their specification can
be interpreted as follows: of the H; hours individual á spends on home production, he
or she considers g;(H;) as a perfect substitute for leisure. The jointness funetion g;(.)
will be assumed to be increasing, twice differentiable and concave in H;. Furthermore
it seems reasonable to require g;(.) G 1 and limHTTg;(H) - 0.' The direct utility
function (1) is thus replaced by: -
U(Xm ~ Z, Lm -~ gm(Hm), L1 ~ 91(H~)). (l I)
It is easy to see that the dichotomy property survives. The partial optimization
problem for the household production decisions of working couples now reads:
max Z(H,,,, HI,XZ) } Wm9m(Hm) } WI91(Ht)
OCH,,,,H~ GT;X,~o
-WmHm -WfHf - XZ.
The first order conditions are:
aZ
ax1
(Hm, Hf, XZ) - 1
(12)
(13)
aHm (Hm, H~, X~) - wm(I - 9m(Hm)) (14)
aZ
(Hm H~ XZ) - Wi(I - 9',(H!)) (15)
For a solution of these equations to be a local maximum, strict concavity of Z is still
sufficient, but it is no longer necessary. In fact, some increasing returns to scale of
household production time is allowed, provided that the extent to which this time is
perceived as leisure falls more. In line with the assumptions we made for the model
without joint production, we assume Z, g,,, and g~ are such that for each pair of
wage rates that we consider, a unique solution to maximization problem (12) exists.
This solution is assumed to be an interior point of [O, T] x[O, T] x R.t. Clearly,
therefore, the objective function in (12) has to be (locally) strictly concave in the
optimal allocation.
An empirical model for the subsample of households in which both partners have
a job, can now be based on equations (13), (14) and (15). In Gronau (1980) this is
done by specifying a semi-log functional form for the marginal production function of
women. There is no joint production in his model and the role of the male partner's
time and auxiliary goods are ignored. In Graham 8t Green (1984) the production
function itself is specified. The Cobb-Douglas specification and the corresponding
4Graham k Green also assume limylo g'(H) - 1. Moreover, they require g; to be etrictly concave.
6form of the jointness functions they employed will be discussed at length in the next
section. They solved the system of first order equations and used the resulting reduced
form equation for H~ to estimate the parameters of Z, g,n and g~.
These applications raise the question whether the equations that were estimated
are only identified by the specific functional forms that were used or that v given
sufficiently many observations - we can distinguish the correct specification from any
other. Put differently, the question is whether or not the class of extended Gronau mo-
dels contains sub-classes of models that are observationally equivalent, if estimation
is based on (13), (14) and (15) or on reduced form equations derived from these. In a
model for household production in which household products and market goods are
no perfect substitutes, we are unable to distinguish between the utility function and
the production function, without further assumptions about the functional forms.
The assumption that both types of commodities are perfect substitutes eliminates
this ambiguity by removing the utility function from the sub-model for the home
production decisions of the employed. By introducing jointness functions into the
model, we also reintroduce elements of the utility function and with it, potential
identification problems. In order to know what significance can be attributed to
estimated household production levels and whether a methodology based on choosing
more flexible functional forms makes sense, we have to investigate what parts of this
model can be identified non-parametrically on the basis of equations (13), (14) and
(15), using data on H,,,, Hf and - possibly - XZ.
The first thing to notice is that we only observe allocations, that are optimal for
some input vector (W,,,,Wj,V). The relationships we want to estimate may thus
be unobservable on parts of the choice set. To make this point more precise, we
have to start by specifying what (W,n, Wj, V) can be observed. Input vectors may
be unobservable for several reasons. There might be institutional restrictions, like
minimum wage legislation. Wage rates are likely to be bounded above by a person's
productívity. Furthermore, as we restrict our attention to households in which both
partners have a paid job, extremely low values of W,,, or W~ and high values of V
will not be present in the sample. Define the set of input vectors (W,,,,Wj,V) that
are observable to be 52.5 Non-labour income influences the labour force participation
decision, but given that both partners are employed, V has no further effect on the
household production decisions. We will therefore usually refer to pairs of wage rates
rather than to elements of S2. For that reason we define the set of observable wage
rates as W- {(W~„ W~) E R} ~(Wm, W~, V) E SZ, for some V E R}. By the
assumptions made before, we can attribute a unique optimal allocation (Hm, Hj, Xi )
to each input vector in W. Now ~-[ is defined as the set of pairs (H,,,, Hf) that are
optimal for some input vector from S2. This step may involve a further reduction in
what we are able to observe, among other things due to non-concavities in Z. We
will assume that W is a connected subset of R~. Given the assumptions about Z,
SStarting from a sampling distribution for (W,,,, W~, V) on R~, Si can be defined as the support
of this distribution.
7gm and gf, made before, 7-l is a connected subset of [O, T] x[O, T).
If we could observe the output of home production, the identification problem
would be that observations of the production function are limited to ~-f. This type of
identification problem is not specific for the household production model, but is in fact
common to almost every structural micro-econometric model. In practice, however,
we do not have information about the output of home production, so that we can
only `observe' the first order conditions. Even in the absence of joint production
we cannot observe the relationship between production factors and output directly,
but we can only scan the curvature of the production function by varying the input
vectors over W. Moreover, as the price of auxiliary goods is normalized at one, the
information we have, can at most describe this curvature along a two-dimensional
non-linear variety in (Hm, H~, Xz)-space.
For each (H,,,, H~), the values for XZ that could make this an optimal choice at
some W E W, have to satisfy (13). This means that Xs will be chosen such as to
maximize the net production given Hm and H~:
Z(Hm, HI )
a`r
max Z(Hm, H~, XZ) - X2. (16)
x,~o
It will be assumed that for all elements of the closure of 7-l this maximization prob-
lem has a unique finite, non-zero solution.s This choice of XZ will be denoted by
~Z(H,,,, H~). In order to ensure that z~Z is differentiable on the closure of 7-[, we will
also assume that BZ~óXL is continuously differentiable.'
Time allocation surveys usually contain information on H,R and Hf, but hardly
ever on the amount of auxiliary goods that is used in home production activities.
If no information about Xz is available , it is clear that we can at most identify
the net product value function (Z) on ~-l. However, even if we do observe XZ, the
previous reasoning indicates, that we still cannot identify Z non-parametrically. But
the additional information will improve the identifiability of the production function
if we restrict our choice to some parametric class of models. An example of this is
the Cobb-Douglas model that will be discussed in the next section. Without data
on XZ we cannot identify all parameters of the production function, because the net
product value function Z is in that case also of the Cobb-Douglas type. If, on the
other hand, we observe XZ, all parameters are identified.
In this discussion we will ignore small-sample considerations and treat the relation-
ships about which we have observations as perfectly known on the set of observable
combinations of Wm, Wf, V, Hm, H~ and XZ. For any given household production
6A sufficient condition is that the marginal product of auxiliary goods is a strictly decreasing
function of X~, ia greater than one for X~ - 0 and eventually falls below one when X: is increased
(for every (H,,,, H~) E ~{).
~Given the asaumptiona we made before, diffetentiability of~y follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem.
ómodel (Z,gm,g~) observational equivalence with another specification (F,k,,,, k~) re-
quires the first order conditions to be identical, i.e.s
8Z
Hm, Hl, ~z(Hm, Ht)) -
1- 9m(Hm) 8F
aH ( 1- k Hm) aH (Hm,Hf,,~F(Hm,Hj)) (I7)
m ,n ( m
aZ ( 1- g,(H,) aF (Hm, HI, ~F(Hm, H!)), (18) óH~ Hm,HJ,~z(Hm,HJ)) - 1- kj(Ht) aH1
for all ( H,,,, H~) E?-l. If the values of XZ are also observed we must also have:
~ZIHm, HI ) - ~F(Hm, Hf), (19)
for all ( H,,,, Hf) E ~-l. These equations guarantee that for each observable pair of wage
rates, the same values for H,,,, Hf and - if observed - XZ satisfy the respective first
order conditions. From (17) and ( 18) it can be seen that the capability to separate
the effects of the jointness functions and the production function in the observed
relationships, draws heavily upon the fact that the jointncss functions are individual-
specific, while the production function also contains cross-effects. Accordingly, it is
important that one partner's optimal choice of H; (i - rn, f) is influenced by a change
in the wage rate of the other partner, except possibly on a subset of W which has
Lebesgue measure zero. We will therefore assume that:
s
aHm aXZ(Hm, H~,~Gz(Hm, H~)) áH~(Hm, H~)}
(20)
f(Hm, H~, t~z(H,,,, Hf)) ~ 0 a.e. on 7-[.
8Hm 8H
This assumption establishes that the subset of ~-(, on which the derivative of the left
hand side of (17) with respect to H~ vanishes, has an empty interior.
The next proposition states that it is in general possible to identify the presence of
joint production in a model for two adult households. Only if the jointness functions
for both partners are identical and linear, an observationally equivalent model without
joint production exists. On the other hand, the proposition implies that the specific
functional form of the joint production is not completely identified non-parametrical-
ly; even if XZ is observed. In general there exist one dimensional equivalence classes
of observationally equivalent spec.ifications. These implications will be elaborated in
the four points following the proposition. It stands to reason that we restrict our
attention to models for household production in which the production function and
jointness functions satisfy the regularity conditions (monotonicity, differentíability
etc.) we imposed above. We will refer to these models as being admissible.
sBy the assumption that for every W E W the household's utility maximization problem has a
unique interior optimum, the slopes of the jointness functiona are less than one in optimal allocations.
a2Z
9Propoaition 1 Given an admissible household production model characterized by a
production function Z and joinlness functions g,,, and gt, there eaists an admissióle
mode! characterixed by F, km and kt that satisfies (17), (18) and (19) on ~-l, only if
for some non-negative eonstant t9
1 -gm(Hm) - 1 -gt(HÍ) - -p (21)
1- km(Hm) 1- kj(Ht)
V
for every (Hm, ttt) E 7-l, where9
~ def
{h E?{ ~ span (fl,~lcone {x E R2 ~ h~- ~ E 7-[ and ~~x~~ G n-1 }) - R2}.
Proof: In the Appendix.
The implications of this proposition for identification in the extended Gronau
model will be discussed in the following four points.
1. What does this proposition tell us about the ability to deterinine whether
joint production is present? Suppose we cannot distinguish a given model from
some alternative specification without joint production. In that case (21) becomes:
1- gm(tIm) - 1- g't(Ht) - ~9 on ?{. This implies that the only case in which
we cannot conclude whether or not there is joint production, is when the jointness
functions of both partners are linear and have identical slopes on ~-L. Generically,
therefore, the presence of joint production is identified.
2. Although identification of the presence of joint production is generically possi-
ble, the specific functional forms are in general not completely identified. For a given
household production model (Z,gm,gt), Yroposition 1 can be, used to construct a
range of observationally equivalent models, indexed by r9. From (21) we can derive
, i-m, k,(tI,) -~~y 1 H, ~ g~(~~) j. (22)
Provided ~9 ) 1- min{inf.~ gm(Hm), inf.~ g't(Ht)}, these functions satisfy all the
conditions we imposed on jointness functions, except for the boundary condition
IimHiT k'(H) - 0. As long as ?{ dces not contain combinations (Hm, Ht), for which
either of the two variables takes on values arbitrarily close to T, the jointness functions
are not identified in the neighbourhood of T, and the definitions above can be adapted
arbitrarily so as to satisfy the boundary condition. A specification of F that would
then satisfy the equivalence relationships (17), (18) and (19) is:
F(Hm, tit, XZ) a~rZ(iim, Ht, Xz) ~ 1,y ~{L(Hm, t~t,~z(r,rm, ~tt)) (23)
-~z(H,.,, Ht)} .
9In words: ~í is the set of elementa of y{, Irom which we can move along at least two paths in
~{, with linearly independent directional derivatives in the starting point. This local property is
neceasary to be able to differentiate equivalences on 7{.
10This specification is well-defined and admissible on ~-1 x R~ and can in general be
extended to an admissible specification on [0, T] x[0, T] x R}.lo If Xz is not observed,
the choice of F is much easier. Take for example:
F(Hm HJ XZ) det
~Z(H,,,, H,, 1i.XZ). (23')
The existence of observationally equivalent specifications may seem to be slightly
disappointing, but in fact the identification is far stronger than might have been
expected. Having a sufficiently large amount of data at our disposal, we will be able
to identify (g,n, g~) non-parametrically within the class of admissible pairs of jointness
functions on ~-L, up to one degree of freedom. An instance in which we may even get
rid of this last degree of freedom is discussed in the next point.
3. If the closure of ?-l contains any points for which H,„ - T or H~ - T, i.e. if
we can observe values for H,n or H~ that are arbitrarily close to T, (non-parametric)
identification on ~l is established, because
~- tt~T 1- k((H) -
1, for i- m or i- f; (24)
implying g;n(H,,,) - k;,,(H,n) and g'~(H~) - k'~(H~), for (H,,,, H~) E ~-1.
4. If we restrict the jointness functions to be elements of some parametric class of
functions, they are identified if no other functions (k,,,, k~) in that class satisfy (21)
for some t9 ~ 1. As an application of this result it is easy to verify that the jointness
functions, that are used in the next section are identified within that parametric class
of specifications.
Identification of joint production in models for one adult households is much
weaker. In the following proposition it will be shown that the presence of joint pro-
duction is not (non-parametrically) identified, even ifobservations on XZ are available.
Define W and ~-í by analogy to the two adult case. Necessary conditions for a model
with home production function Z and jointness function g to be equivalent with a
model with production function F, but no joint production, is that the following
conditions are satisfied on 1-l
áH(H,~Gz(H)) - (1 -9(H)) aH(H,~GF(H)) (25)
~z(H) - ~F(H). (26)
~{ now is an interval. Define Ho - inf ~-( and H' - sup 7-f. We can then derive the
following result.
lolf we would restrict our attention to globally strictly concave production functions, it ia easy to
show that whenever Z ia atrictly concave, so is F(on 7{ x R~).
11Proposition 2 Let an admissible one adult household production model be charac-
terized by a production function Z and a jointness function g. If the set of observable
wage rates W is bounded above, the production function F defaned by
F(H X) - Z(H X) f 9~(Ho) a
Z(Ho,Tl~a(Ho)) min(Ho, H)
1 - g'(Ho) 8H
min(H.N') g~(H) ÓZ
} Jmin(No.H) 1- g'(H) 8H(H, ~z(H)) dH (27)
f g'(H') aZ (H', ~Z(H`)) max(0, H- H`)
1 - g'(H') 8H
satisfies (,~SJ and (,26J and is admissible. If Z is strictly concave on [0, T] x[0, T] x R~,
so is F.
Proof: In the Appendix.
As it is this simple to find an observationally equivalent model without joint
production, it will be even easier to find arbitrary equivalent models with joint pro-
duction. In fact, given a model (Z,g), for every jointness function k with k' C g' on
[0, T], an admissíble production function that makes (F, k) observationally equivalent
to (Z, g), is given by (27) with g'~(1 - g') replaced by (g' - k')~(1 - g'). It may be
noted that for some specifications - among which the one discussed in the next sec-
tion - the integral in (27) still exists when the interval of integration is replaced by
[0, T]. In such cases W does not have to be bounded and Ho and H' can be set equal
to zero and T, respectively. If we cannot observe Xzi we get even more freedom in
choosing observationally equivalent specifications. We must therefore conclude that
this class of models has limited power for the analysis of time allocation data of one
adult households in the presence of joint production. Estimation results from these
models have to be considered with great care.
123 A Specific Formulation
In this section we will focus on a particular specification of the extended Gronau
model, taking Z to be a Cobó-Douglas production functíon. This specification alightly
generalizes the model of Graham 8t Green (1984). To ease comparison, we will stay
as close as possible to the notation employed in the Graham 8t Green article.
Z - A(MmHm)~m(M~H~)~~Xp (28)
with:
N~
log A - aa -~ ~ ak log Ak
k-1
N,,,
log Mm - ~ ak log Mm,k
k-1
N~
log M~ - ~ bk log M~,k
k-1
O~~~ 1 i 7m v ~il i ~.
The Ak terms are household characteristics such as family size or the number of young
children. Mm,k and M~,k are characteristics that specifically influence the productivity
of the male and the female partner, respectively (like age and education). Clearly,
in the Cobb-Douglas specification there is no real difference between the roles of
the general and the sex-specific exogenous variables." A matching pair of jointness




with b,,,, b~ 1 0. If bm-ó~-0, there is no joint production. Increasing b,,, and bf
raises the amount of joint production, until eventually - at infinitely large values for
ê,,, and b~ - all home production time is perceived as leisure. Solving the first order
conditions (13), (14) and (15) for this specification, we get 12
log H,n - D-t r 17í a log
`7,n )~-
( 1 -b b~) ~log ry.n -}- 1 Q a log Q~
f I bi -~ 7J ~ bm (1 -F b~)~ log T j
t1For that reason, Graham 8t Green's interpretation of M; as partner i's embedded human capital
is vacuous. Equally meaningless is their use of ~kA1 at and ~k ~ t ó4 as measures of the relative
productivity at home as compared to his or her market productivity.
12As we have no data on auxiliary goods that are used in home production, the equation Cor X,
cannot be used.
13~-D-' ~ 1 ryf a- 1 - b~~ log W,,, - D-' 1 ryfR log Wj (30)
-~D-' i~~ log A f D-' i}~ rym log M,,,
1 1 ~- b~
~D- 1- Q 7I log M1
log H~ - D-1 ( 17,RR log ~.1'I ~
f(1 ~- b,n )~1og 7I f 1 ~ a log Q~
f I bi -~~?',,, -f- b~(1 -f b,,,)~ logT1
-D-' 1 ry~`a log W,n f
D-' ~ 1 ry.,`a - 1- bm~ log W~ (31)
fD-' i~~ log A f D-' i}~ ry,,, log M,,,
1 1 -~ b,n ~-D-
1 - ,Q ry11og
M~.
D is the determinant of the subsystem of first order conditions in terms of H,,, and
H~ alone:
D-(1 ~bm)(1 fb1)-(1 -~b,,,)1ry'a -(1-i-b1)lryma.
For this to be a well-defined structural household production model, the solutions
to the first order conditions have to satisfy the second order conditions for local
optimality. It can be shown that this is achieved by adding one more inequality to
the above mentioned sign conventions:
lfbm~lfb~~aCl.
(32)
This inequality generalizes the requirenient that there be~ decreasing returns to scale.
It is equivalerit to the additional restriction D~ 0.
This is a convenient specification, that - provided identification is guaranteed -
can be estimated by means of the maximum likelihood method, but that could also be
estimated using OLS and imposing the implied parameter restrictions in an additional
ALS-step. The analytical tractability is acquired at the cost of using a simple and
relatively inflexible functional form for the production function. Firstly, there are
no person-specific productivity effects. A characteristic that increases one partner's
marginal productivity, increases that of the other partner in the same proportion.
Secondly, Hm and H~ are restricted to be complements in home production.
Application of Proposition 1 of the previous section shows that if two jointness
functions of this type - with b;'~ and b;(2~, say - are observationally equivalent, we
must have
14H~b~l~-~~~) - ~9, for some 19 ~ 0.
As a consequence the joint.ness functions are identified. On the other hand, we have
no data on auxiliary goods XZ. Accordingly we can at most (non-parametically)
identify the net product value function. For this model, the optimal amount of
auxiliary goods and the net product value for given (Hm, Hj) are
~z(Hm,Ht) - Qrl(r-p)Arl(1-A)(MmHm)7m~(r-v)(M~g~)7~l(r-p)
Z(H.n, HI) - (1 - Q)Qp~(1-R)Arl(r-a)(MmHm)7m~(r-A)(M~H~)7~~(1-A)
Clearly, Z is itself a Cobb-Douglas production function, where the factor elasticities
have been redefined. The person-specific scale factors Mm and M~ are identical to the
ones in Z and the general scale coefficient has the same functiional form as A. This
implies that we cannot identify all parameters of the household production function.
In particular, the technical coef)'icient of XZ, ~, is underidentified.
More formally: the reduced forrn cocaTicients of W,,, and W~ in (30) and (31)
allow us to identify ry,,,~(1 -~3), ry~~(1 - Q), bm and b~. Furthermore, ak, bk and
ak~(1 -~i) (k ~ 0) can be identified from the reduced form coefficients of M,,,, Mf
and A. That leaves the constant terms to identify ao and Q. Substitution of the




1-~ log Q-f- log(1 -~) - C;, z- m, f;
where Cm and C~ are known expressions in terms of the reduced form parameters.





cYO - ~o f a log Q f log(i -,(i)
i-Q 1-,Q
~k
~k - ~ k - 1,...,Nq
1 - ,Q
NA
log A- áo f~ ák log Ak.
k-1
These parameters are all identified and represent everything that can be identified in
this setting. In terms of these parameters the level of output of home production as
a function of the observed production factors is given by
13The ak and 6k parameters are not changed. As the discussion above indicates, these parameters
are (over-)identified. Additional knowledge of Q would identify all parameters in (30) and (31).
15Z(H,n, HJ, ~z(H.n, HJ)) - I I QA(Mmttm)"m(MJHJ)"'-
In order to obtain estimates of the volume of home production, ~i has to be known.
Information about XZ or Z is required to estimate the last unidentified parameter,
~3. Estimates of the structural parameters of this model will therefore not enable us
to derive estimates of the output of horne production! We can, however, estimate the
net product value function Z and the jointness functions. Furthermore, even though
we cannot estimate the production function itself, we have enough information to
analyze the type of returns to scale, as:
1-Q-7m-7J
1 - '1'm - 7J - . ~-Q
In terms of the identified parameters the equations for H,„ and HJ become
logHm - D-r {7J log(7JI7m) ~(1 ~ bJ)(~o ~ log~rm)
-f- ((bJ - 6,,,)'1'J ~- ó,,,(1 f aI)) logT}
fD-' (yJ - 1- hJ) log W,,, - D-r7J log WJ
N~ N,,,
fÏ7-1(1 f óJ) ~ dk log Ak -F D-1(1 f bJ)y,n ~ ak log M,n,k
k-1 k-1
N~
-f-D-1(1 f bt)7J ~ bk log MJ.k,
k-1
(33)
log HJ - D-' {7,n log(7,n~7J) ~(1 f óm)(áo ~- log7J)
~ ((óm - aJ)7m -f- bJ(1 -~ ó,,,)) logT}
-D-' `ry,n log W,,, -~ D-r (y,,, - 1- b,,,) log WJ (34)
N~ N.,,
fD-1(1 t bm) ~ ák log Ak f D-1(1 ~- 6m)7m ~ ak log Mm,k
k-1 k-1
N~
-fD-' (1 f bm)~1'I ~ bk 1og MJ,k,
with
k-1
D -(1 f bm)(1-~ sJ) -(1-~ óm)7J -(i ~- bJ)7m.
Fstimation of this model differs in some respects from the application in Graham
8t Green (1984). The most evident difference is that they only use the equation
for log HJ. As a result, their model is underidentified by two parameters. Another
difference is that they do not use the structural restrictions on the intercept of that
equation. Even if they would have done so, their model would still have been underi-
dentified by one parameter. Surprisingly enough, the only parameter that is identified
16in their model, is ~3. In Kooreman óL Kapteyn (1987) it was demonstrated that - even
without imposing the structural restrictions on the intercepts - the specification of
Graham 8z Green ís identified if both the log H~-equation and the log Hm-equation are
used. These results deviate sharply from the identification properties of the model de-
scribed above. This difference is caused by two additional assumption underlying the
Graham 8t Green model. In terms of model (28) the assumptions Graham ót Green
implicitly - and as it seems unwittingly - made are ao - 0 and ~k "1 a; - 1. These
additional assumptions clearly reduce the identification requirernents, but they lack
any theoretical foundation or meaningful interpretation. In íact, these restrictions
are sensitive to changes in the dimension of the exogenous and endogenous variables.
For exa.mpl~, th~ timc llsf'9 may be defin~cl in hours, minutes or even in seconds.
We do not have a natural unit in which time is measurecí in this model. Uue to the
assumption ao-0, the estimated production function is restricted to be in different
- and even disjunct - sub-classes of models, for each unit of time measurement. In
the general model, discussed above, ao adjusts in such a way that, whatever the unit
in which time is measured, the model we estimate is the same. Tliese arbitrary as-
sumptions may thus also be the cause of the unsatisfactory results in applications of
the Graham ói Green model. More importantly, as a result of these restrictions, the
fact that it is not possible to estimate p and Z, from data on time allocations only,
remained unnoticed. The Q and Z Craham 8a Green calculated can be related to the
true but unknown parameters (denoted by') and the true, but unknown output level
Z' by the following expressions:
hm ca~c - ~kA'
ak - 1 f Q.
P Q N,, .
~k-1 ak
[~ N~
r7 [~` NA tr 1 1,Lkm1 ak
plim Zca~c - ( G'C-á~XLk-1 k-
~
Rescaling and redefining the exogenous variables, we can make these estimates as
high or as low as we want. In general, therefore, estimates írom the Graham 8z Green
approach are grossly misleading.14
In the previous section we concluded that the identification oí the jointness func-
tion in the one adult household model, has to be forced by the choice of functional
form. Although this makes it difficult to interpret estimates from a model of that
type, it is interesting to see how the results on non-parametric identification relate
to the identification of the parameters in a Cobb-Douglas specification. If we have
no data on XZ, the model is underidentified by two: from the coefficient of W in
the reduced form equation of log H, we have to identify y, Q and b. If, on the other
hand, XZ is observed, we can jointly estimate the reduced form equations of log H
and log XZ. In that case all parameters are identified.
14Likewise, it can be seen that the type of returna to scale Graham 8c Green derive, is correct if
and only if ~k"1 ak ~ 0. The validity of that condition essentially depends on the definition of the
exogenous variables. Consider for example (1~Ak) instead of Ak!
174 Estimation Results
The data that were used to estimate (33) and (34) are from the Swedish HUS-data
(Klevmarken 8c Olovsson (1986)). The first wave of this panel dataset contained
detailed information on home production activities. The respondents were asked
about their activities on the day preceding the interview. As was indicated in the
previous sections we will restrict our attention t,o two adult households. The sample
that was used consisted oí 517 households in which both partners were employed and
302 in which one or both of the partners did not have a job.
A, M,,, and MI are defined as:
log A1 - 1, if the family owns a house, 0 otherwise (ál );
log A2 - log familysize (~2);
logA3 - log(1 f number of children younger than 7) (á3);
logA4 - log(1 -~ number of cars) (r74);
log Ihlm,l - log age of male partner (a1);
log Mm,2 - log years of education of male (a2);
log MI,1 - log age of female partner (bl );
log MI,2 - log years of education of female (b2).
An important assumption in deriving the model is that individuals assume that their
(net) wage rates are constant. Use of the reported average net wage rates thus seems
most appropriate.ls The econornetric model is specified as follows:
log H.,,,i - fm(Xii B) ~ um,i
log HI,i - .Ï!(Xi~ B) f ul,i
with:
(
um,1 ~ I ~r' i.i.d. N
` ` 0 ) ~ ~ al
] Q2 1 ~ ~ '
u1,J N 0 Q2,1 Q2,2
(35)
and fm and fI as defined in (33) and (34). The nuisance terms u,,,,J and ul,~ may
contain unobserved heterogeneity in the production function, modelling áo as a ran-
dom variable. Furthermore, u accounts for optimization errors and for measurement
errors (independent and multiplicative) in the reported time allocations, in the wage
rates or in other exogenous variables. Finally, there may be excess variation in daily
time expenditures relative to the optimal daily-average levels.
The maximum likelihood estimates of this model are presented in table 4.1. One
is tempted to compare these to the estimates Graham 8a Green presented. For each
combination of identifying restrictions they considered, at least one of the ry and b
coefficients was negative. Other applications of that model - using only the log HI-
equation - were reported in Homan, Hagenaars ét van Praag (1987,1988). In the first
~SFstimates based on the marginalnet wage rates are very similar to the estimates in this section.
18Table 4.1 Maacimum Likelihood Estimates of model (35)
rym 1.1165" (4.57) 3.4088 (1.15)
ry~ 2.4912" (4.55) 8.6474 (1.19)
ám 6.4943 (0.86)
á~ 8.9808 (0.85)
al --0.0315 (-0.04) -0.0448 (-0.17)
a2 -0.2032 (-0.80) -0.0899 (-0.67)
bl -0.0213 (-0.07) -0.0020 (-0.02)
bz 0.4986" (4.08) 0.1479 (1.13)
r7o 0.4029 (0.24) -26.2935 (-0.84)
r71 -0.5485" (-2.15) -0.5999" (-1.97)
á2 -0.3798 (-1.40) -0.3966 (-1.27)
ix3 -1.0132" (-2.56) -1.1777" (-2.35)
á4 -0.3258 (-1.21) -0.4072 (-1.29)
ol,l 1.3259" (15.94) 1.2464" (15.99)
02,1 0.0672' (1.86) 0.0959" (2.77)
a2,2 0.5008" (15.96) 0.4906" (16.00)
Log-likelihood -1359.59.f0 -1336.1404
t-statistics between parentheses.
~` - significant at l0010 -level.
'~ - significant at 5ol0 -level.
of these papers, they use, among other methods, the Graham 8c Green model to cal-
culate the monetary value of home production for the Netherlands. They found only
one set of identifyirig restrictions - out of nine - for which the y and ó parameters
had the right sign. In the second paper they just state: "(...) the empirical perfor-
mance of this model was not well enough to present the estimation results here.n.
Furthermore, joint estimation of the equations for log H,,, and log H~ of the Graham
óc Green specification, using the HUS-data, invariably turned up with large negative
values for -y,,, and ry~. After the discussion in the previous section this doesn't come
as a surprise.
Turning to the estimation results in table 4.1, we see that the estimates of the ry"
and ó parameters all have the right sign. The estimates in the first column are for the
model without jointness (ó,,,-ó~-0). The restrictions ó,,,-ó~-0 are strongly rejected
by the likelihood ratio test. Including joint production leads to higher, but - due to
correlation with óm and ê~ - insignificant estimates for "rym and `ry~. The effect of the
presence of young children on their parents' household productivity (~3), is estimated
19to be significantly negative. A similar discording result applies to the cceffiicient
of the house-owner dummy (~1). However, we can calculate from these estimates,
that owning a house increases the amount of time in home production by 28.3~o for
the male, and by 20.6q for the female. The elasticities of home production time
with respect to the number of young children in the household, are also significantly
positive, as would be expected (0.4891 for men and 0.3673 for women). The first child
increases the number of hours devoted to home productive activities by 40P1o and 29a1o,
for males and females respectively. 5imilarly, the level of education of women (b2)
tends to raise the productivity, but has a negative effect on home production time.
The apparent anomaly of opposite effects on the productivity and the amount of
time spent on home production, signals that still something must be wrong. Closer
inspection reveals that the estimates do not satisfy the second order conditions (32).
Therefore, DCO, leading to the sign reversal of the estimated effects on productivity.
The overidentifying restrictions, that the structural model imposes on the reduced
form coefficients are not rejected by a likelihood ratio test at the 5qo level (the test
statistic is 11.5 and X9(16.9)-0.95). The violation of the second order conditions
implies, on the other hand, that we cannot interpret these restrictions as being derived
from a well-defined behavioural model of time allocation.
In estimating model (35), we ignored the problem of endogenous sample stratifi-
cation. A next step, therefore, is to include the labour force participation decisions
in the analysis. This could be achieved by modelling the participation decision in the
context of the original utility maximization problem. This would, however, force us to
specify the utility function. We would have to make further paralnetric assumptions
and the analytical tractability wollld most likely be lost. This approach also ignores
the presence of involuntary unemployment. We therefore extended model (35) with
a bivariate probit model, that describes the employment probabilities.
log
Hm.i - fm(X.7~ B) ~ um.i
log Hf,i - ff(Xi, B) -} uf,i
,
m.i - Rm,i m } vm,i
SÍ.i - RÍ,ia! ~ vf,i
where
}
if 5;,,,~ ~ 0 and Sf,~ 1 0,
um,J 0 Ql,l Q2,1 Q3,1 Q4,1
uf,J i.iNd. 0 02,1 Q2,2 Q3,2 Q4,2
vm,J
I XJ i Rm,J ~ Rf,J ~
0 ~ Qg,l 03 2 1 Oq.3
vf.7 ~ a 4,1 a4,2 ~4~3 1
(36)
In the employment probits we use age, education level, non-labour income, familysize
and the number of young children in the household as exogenous variables. The
























1.1307" (4.43) 2.2987' (1.70)
2.5239" (4.47) 6.9718' (1.83)
3.9897 (1.24)
5.3548 (1.22 )
-0.4401 (-0.57) -0.3530 (-0.67)
-0.1586 (-0.61) -0.1324 (-0.67)
0.0878 (0.28) 0.0449 (0.32)
0.4970" (3.91) 0.2045' (1.73)
0.9805 (0.56) -15.178 (-L13)
-0.5715" (-2.18) -0.6979' (-1.90)
-0.3650 (-1.29) -0.4358 (-1.19)
-0.9223" (-2.33) -1.1548" (-2.03)
-0.3109 (-1.15) -0.4472 (-1.24)
1.5545" (12.04) 1.4425" (12.29)
0.0935 (1.37) 0.1280" (2.30)
0.5042" (14.17) 0.4980" (14.29)
-0.9530" (-6.94) -0.8931"' (-6.19)
-0.0240 (-0.14) -0.0262 (-0.19)
1. 1.
0.5153" (3.54) 0.4716" (3.42)
0.1007 (0.54) 0.1401 (1.03)
-0.0537 (-0.45) -0.0499 (-0.91)
1. 1.
bivariate probit model is a reduced form rnodel, in the seuse that its coefficients are
not related to the structural parameters. As opposed to the model of home production
time, the employment probit is marginal with respect to the wage rate; i.e. the wage
rate has been elimínated from the probit equations, for example by substituting wage
equations.
The ML-estimates of this model are in table 4.2. Once more, the restrictíons
b,,,-b~-0 are firmly rejected. The estimates of the probit part of the model are very
satisfactory. The parameters have the signs and relative magnitudes that one ex-
pects them to have. The correlation of the disturbances are well below 0.5, except
for the correlation between um and vm, which equals -0.74. This means that unex-
plained variation in the male participation probit and in the log H,,,-equation works
in opposite directions.
















-38.916" (-3.13) -39.852" (-3.24)
15.595 (1.67) 16.961' (1.85)
-2.3345' (-1.86) -2.5187" (-2.04)
0.8616 (0.47) 0.8093 (0.46)
-0.1180 (-0.29) -0.1284 (-0.32)
5.8627 (0.70) 5.2208 (0.63)
-0.7229 (-0.63) -0.6346 (-0.57)
1.5900 (0.80) 1.3789 (0.76)
-0.2064 (-0.45) -0.1565 (-0.37)
-2.0793" (-4.75) -2.1204" (-4.86)
0.3198 (1.14) 0.3593 (1.30)
-0.2394 (-0.92) -0.2677 (-1.01)
-0.2132 (-0.81) -0.1977 (-0.76)
Sw-equation
Constant -40.525"' (-4.18) -40.942" (-4.20)
log(age,n) 3.0056 (0.42) 2.9326 (0.41)
log(age,,,)2 -0.3906 (-0.41) -0.3771 (-0.39)
log(education,,,) 4.0709" (2.34) 4.2891" (2.44)
log(education,,,)z -0.8647" (-2.33) -0.9047" (-2.42)
log(age~) 19.750" (3.08) 19.783" (3.08)
log(age~)2 -2.8381" (-3.21) -2.8416" (-3.21)
log(education~) -2.6087 (-1.23) -2.5078 (-1.20)
log(education~)2 0.6360 (1.38) 0.6166 (1.35)
Non-labour income -1.6187" (-4.77) -1.6109" (-4.74)
(Non-labour income)2 0.7296`" (3.39) 0.7226" (3.35)
log(familysize) --0.0737 (-0.35) -0.0663 (-0.31)
log(lf~ young children) -0.8046" (-4.50) -0.7988" (-4.44)
Log-likelihood
t-statistics between parentheses.
' - significant at l0010 -level.
" - significant at 5010 -level.
-1929.7609 -1908.0945
22rejected by a likelihood ratio test at the 5~0 level: the likelihood ratio is 13.3, the crit-
ical value 16.9. The parameter estimates of these equations are very similar to those
in table 4.1. The estimates of the -y's and b's are lower, but gained in significance. In
the reduced form of the log Hm-equation, log Wm now has the theoretically required
negative sign, albeit insignificant. But the other three wage coefficients in the reduced
form equations have the wrong sign. Indeed, condition (32) is still violated.
The second order conditions - or equivalently the sign restrictions on the struc-
tural parameters and the condition D~ 0- imply that the reduced form coeffiicients
of the wage rates in the equations of home production time are all negative. Un-
restricted estimation of the reduced form equations indicates that this claim is not
supported by the data. In the log H~-equation both wage coeflicients are significantly
positive. As can be seen from equations (33) and (34), this tends to push the value
of D below zero and reverses the signs of the parameters of the other exogenous vari-
ables in the production fimction (the a's, b's and ~'s). Furthermore, this result seems
to be robust for the Cobb-Douglas specification. We estimated various alternative
spccifications of Lhc probit cquations, M,,,, M~ aud A and - arnong othc~r things
allowed "rym and ry~ to be functions oí age and education. Invariably, D was estimated
to be negative.
We must conclude from this that the causes of the problem are more fundamental,
possibly contravening the Cobb-Douglas specification or even the general framework.
The positive correlations between log Wm and log H~ and between log W~ and log H,,,
(the latter one is often not significant) indicate that home production time of the
two partners are substitutes, rather than complements. For this reason the Cobb-
Douglas specification might be too restrictive and it seems worthwhile to investigate
more flexible specifications.
The Gronau model does not predict anything about the cross-wage effects, but
the own-wage effects must be negative. The positive correlation between log H~ and
log W~ is therefore not only a problem for the specification of section 3, but is at
variance with the Gronau model itself.rs Similar adverse correlations were reported
in Flood (1988), for roughly the same dataset as we have used." We could follow
Flood in concluding that this discredits the general framework, but it seems more
appropriate that the positive correlation between home production time and the
wage rate reflects a spurious correlation across the sample, rather than the response
of individuals to a change in their wage rate. This spurious correlation could for
instance be caused by the endogeneity of the average net wage rate.
Suppose for exatnple, that gross wage rates are equal, but taxation is progressive.
In that case the (average) net wage rate will be negatively related to the number of
16The same correlation for the male partner was always close to zero and insignificant.
17Flood reports poaitive correlations between time spent on maintenance and repair activitiea and
the net wage rate. This correlation was not significant for malea, but atrongly eignificant for femalea:
"A 1 percent increase in the marginal tax rate impliea on average that femalea apend about halí an
hour lesa time on repair and maintenance activitiea each week.".
23hours worked in a paid job. If, furthermore, differences in the productivity at home
are the predominant source of heterogeneity in the population,18 H and N tend to
move in opposite directions, individuals allocating their non-leisure time mainly to
the type of work - at home or in the labour market - that they perform best. This
would induce a positive correlation between the net wage rate and the time devoted
to household production. Stating this argument in a slightly different way: divide
the sample into subsamples of people with the same gross wage rates. Between these
subsamples, we might expect to find the negative correlation between the (gross)
wage rate and the number of hours devoted to home production, but within these
subsamples, the people that allocate little time to home production typically work
more hours in a paid job and have a lower marginal or average net wage rate.
The spurious correlation will thus be stronger if the endogeneity of the wage rates
is more important; i.e. if the tax system is more progressive. The more equal the
wage distribution, the more likely it is that this correlation dominates the negative
correlation between H and W, caused by behavioural responses to wage variation.
Sweden, with its relatively equal wage distribution and a progressive tax system
fits these requirements very well. The positive correlation between H~ and Wj in
the IIUS-data does therefore not imply that we have to abandon the Gronau-type of
model as our maintained hypothesis. But it indicates that the assumption of constant
wage rates is troublcsome and the endogeneity of Lhe wage rate shotild be modelled
explicitly.19
Reverting our explanation of the positive correlation between Hf and W~ in the
HUS-data, we would expect that in American data - with larger wage differences
and a less progressive tax system - the negative correlation predicted by the theory
will dominate. In fact, in the reduced form estimates Graham 8e Green present
for the American PSID-data, the coefficient of log Wj in the equation for log H~
is significantly negative. This indicates that the model set out in section 3 might
perform much better on American time allocation data.
~dif the population is only heterogeneous with respect to the preference for leisure, time spent on
home production and in a paid job move in the same direction.
19See Kooreman (1987) for a possible way to extend the Gronau-íramework with progressive
taxation. Allowing for the fact that individuals take the progressive tax system into account, we
have to specify the utility function. In general this will render the derivation of reduced form
equations difficult, if not impossible.
245 Concluding Remarks
The analysis irr t,his paper illustrates that the Gronau model, extended with the
possibility of joint production, provides a powerful and convenient framework for
analysing time allocation data. The ability to identify the household production
function from the preferences, is attained by the assumption that the output of home
production activities is a perfect substiLute for goods that can be boughL in the
market. The resulting dichotomy property for the decisions in households in which
both partners have a job, simplifies an otherwise complicated analysis considerably.
It was shown, that in a model for two adult households, it is possible to identify joint
production non-parametrically on the basis of time allocation data only. For one
adult households that property is lost, implying that the analysis is in fact restricted
to the Gronau model without joint production.
A specification similar to that proposed by Graham 8c Green was discussed in
section 3. It was shown that their formulation is not well-specified. In the more
general specification we proposed, it is not possible to identify the complete household
production function from time allocation data only. For that purpose we also need
observations on the auxiliary goods (X;) or on the output level (Z).
The application of this model to the HtJS-data demonstrates the central role of
the assumption that wage rates are constant. For countries in which the endogeneity
of the wage rate is of limited importance, the Gronau framework may be applicable.
But for countries with progressive taxation or other significant non-linearities in the
budget sets of the agents, the resulting endogeneity of the wage rate should be in-
corporated in the model. As far as this means that we have to drop the assumption
that individuals perceive their wage rate as being constant, the relative simplicity of
the Gronau model will most definitely be lost.
25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
For notational convenience the arguments H,,, and H~ will be suppressed. We will abbre-
viate expressions like
8Hm óHI (Hm, Ht, ~z(Hm, HJ)) ~ 8Hm 8HI (~z).
Differentiating ( 17) with respect to HJ and ( 18) with respect to H,,, gives
z z
8Hm 8HI (~z) } 8Hm 8Xi (~z) 8H7 -
1- g;,, 8zF 8zF B~GF




aH~ aHm(~Z) } aH~ ax~(~Z) atrm
1- g' 8zF 8zF 8~F J
1- kj 8HI 8Hm (~F) } aHI 8XZ ( ~F) 8Hm ,
for (H,,,, HI) E 7-(. From the definition of ~(iz and ~iF we have




on ?{. Differentiating these two equalities with respect to H,,, and III, respectively, gives
for (Ilm, H~) E 'H
z z
8Xz 8H; ('Gz) -~ (aX )2 (~Gz) a~Z - fi, f - ~, f;
z z
8Xi 8H; (~GF) ~ (~X )z (~GF) ~~~ -0, i-m,Í-
These equations imply that the left hand sides of (37) and (38) are equal on ?{. The same
goes for the terms in parentheses on the right hand sides of (37) and (38). By assumption
(20), this implies that for almost every (H„~, H~) E 7{:
1 - 9in(Hm) - 1 - g7(HJ) - ~
1 - km(Hm) 1 - k'I(H~)
(40)
for some non-negative constant ~9. By the continuity oí the first order derivatives of the
jointness functions this property holds for every (Hm, HI) E~f. O
26Proof of Proposition 2
Under the assumptions we made about g, we have that for H E[flo, H`]:
0 C
1 9,g~H) 8H (H, ~z(H)) ~ 1 - g'(H) 8H(H, ~Gz(ff )). (41)
The term on the right is equal to the wage rate at which (fI, r~z(ff)) is an optimal choice.
Therefore, the integrand is bounded on 1{ and the integral exists. Having established that
definition (27) is sound, we have to show that this function satisfies (25) and (26) and is
admissible. It is straightforward to verify that F satisfies (25). Equality of tGz and tGp on
1( follows directly from:
8~(H,~Gz(H)) - 1 - X~(H,~GF(H)). (42)
Clearly, F is twice differentiable and 8F~8X2 is continuously differentiable. By the first
inequality in (41), F is also strictly increasinR. The household production decisions for a
one adult household, where the adult has a pa.id job, can be described by the following
optimi2ation problem
max Z(H,X~) ~ Wg(H)- X~ - 6VH. (43)
H,X.
By assumption, this problem has a unique int.erior solution for each W E W. Therefore the




(áH)~(~,~z(H)) f 9"(F!)W ~ 0,
z
(áXZ)2(N, ~Gz(K)) { (aH)2(K, rGz(H)) ~ 9~~(H)w'
- I ~zL (H,~í'z(ff))J




where tI is the optimal number of hours spent on home production at wage rate W. Dif-
ferentiating the left hand side of (42) with respect to fI we get
8Xs8H(H,rGz(H))f (aXZ)z(H,rGz(f7)) ~Hz(A)-0 onfi.
Together with (46) and (44) this gives
(aH)z(H,~z(H))f9~~(H)W } 8XZ8f1(H,rGz(H)) á z(f~)C 0. (47)
27The partial maximization problem of an employed individual with production function F
and no joint production is:
~H g'(II) 8Z
HEímt:x,~o Z(H,X:) ~ J`~o 1 - g'(H)
aH(H,Tbz(H))dH - WII - XZ. (48)





w f 1 a2Z (Ir, ~Gz(II )) (aXz) 1- g'(tr) 1- g'(Ïr) (aH)z
f g~(H) a~z (ÏI,~Gz(fl)) aH~(H)} - ~aHaxz(H,~Gz(R))~z 1- g'(H) atl aXz
should be negative and positive, respectively. The first requirement is met by (44). The





} axaxz(If,~Z(tl)) áH'(fl) ~
r z
(aXZ)2(H,T~z(II)) S (aH)2(H,~z(H)) f 9"(H)W - L
azZ (li, rGz(H))1
z . aH aX2
From (44), (47) and (46) this expression is seen to be positive. We now only have to verify
that FI is also a global optimum for (48).
Condition (47) guarantees that the right hand term in (41) is strictly decreasing on 7-[.
From this it is easy to see that the integrand in (27) is strictly decreasing on (Ho, H'), i.e.
g~(II~) aZ (n', ~z(H')) ~ w'g'(H) ~ g~(Ho) a7 (no,~Gz(Ilo)). (49) 1- g'(n-) átr 1- g'(tro) áH
The objective function of (48) differs from that in (43) by a term Q(fl) - Wg(II), where
Q(fl) de~ F(H,XZ) - Z(ff,XZ). From (49) it follows that this term is monotonically
increasing on [0, Ho] and monotonically decreasing on [H`,T]. On (Ho, H'):
Q'(H)-wg'(H)-g'(H){i-g'(H) aH(H,~z(H))-W},
which is monotonically dccreasing, with value zcro in II. Thc~refore, Q(11) attains its
maximum value in tl and the maximization problem (48) has its unique global maximum
in H. The household production model with production function F and no joint production
is admissible.
Q(H) is linear on [0, Ho] U [H',T] and - as we just learned - concave on (Ilo, H'). As
a consequence, F is strictly concave on [0,7'] x Rt if Z is. ~
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